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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) as a case poured over from the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In addition to Appellants' statements of issues, the following 
also are at issue: 
A. Whether the trial court, having found and held that 
EnviroPak was the alter-ego of Surgical, erred in terminating the 
accrual of damages as of the date EnviroPak's business activities 
ended, rather than awarding damages through the entire agreed 
contract term when Surgical has continued to exist during all 
relevant times. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989). 
B. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Diston 
was not able to recover damages for the agreed-upon, and fixed amount 
of, automobile allowance absent evidence of the amount for which the 
automobile would be used for the business. 
Standard of Review: Clear error. Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The only statute at issue herein is the statute of frauds, Utah 
Code Annotated §25-5-4(1) and §25-5-8. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. Nature of the Case. Mr. John Diston, Plaintiff below and 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant herein ("Mr. Diston"), generally accepts the 
"Statement of the Case" contained in Appellants' Brief. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Mr. Diston accepts the Appellants' 
Statement of "Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below," except as 
to the following additional points: 
Mr. Diston filed a notice of cross-appeal on December 1, 1993 
(R539)1. EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak") and Surgical 
Technologies, Inc., formerly known as Pinnacle Environmental, Inc. 
("Surgical"), Defendants below and Appellants/Cross-Appellees herein 
(collectively, "Defendants") have not addressed Mr. Diston's cross-
appeal in their brief. Mr. Diston cross-appeals upon two issues: 
First, while the trial court found that EnviroPak was merely the 
alter ego of Surgical, the court did not award damages for the full 
contract period during which Surgical and/or its alter-ego EnviroPak 
were doing business; Second, the court declined to award damages for 
an agreed fixed sum of a car allowance on the rationale that no 
evidence was before the court as to the percentage of time or use Mr. 
Diston was required to use the car in connection with Mr. Diston's 
employment. 
1
 Citations to the findings of fact are denoted "FF," 
followed by its paragraph number. References to exhibits are 
denoted "Ex," followed by the number. Other citations to the 
Record are denoted "R," followed by the page number and other 
identifying information as appropriate. The main three contract 
exhibits, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Judgment are attached hereto as Addenda. 
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C. Statement of Facts. In late 1990 and early 1991r Frederick 
P. Ninow ("Mr. Ninow") was employed with a company named Professional 
Medical (FF6). During this time, Mr. Ninow began planning and 
efforts for the manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged surgical 
supply packets featuring principal components to be laundered, 
sterilized and prepacked for repeated use in surgical and other 
health care procedures (FF7, R581). During his process of planning, 
Mr. Ninow became acquainted with, and approached, John Diston ("Mr. 
Diston") for ideas and suggestions; and this developed into Mr. 
Ninow's determination to form his own company for that purpose 
(FF8,9; R580-582) . At that time, Mr. Diston was employed by Holy 
Cross Hospital as Director of Peri-Operative Services (FF5; R24); and 
he was happy in that job and had exceptional job performance 
evaluations (R579). As a result of the discussions, Mr. Ninow and 
Mr. Diston ultimately agreed that Mr. Diston would be a key employee 
of the company, to serve as Director/Operations, which included being 
vice-president of quality control and production {FF10; R604, 639, 
751, 762). 
In the Summer of 1991, to obtain funding to proceed with 
marketing and sale of these products, Mr. Ninow met with principals 
of Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical") (FF12), a publicly-traded 
company having other subsidiaries (R665-66,688,690). These meetings 
led to agreement for Surgical to form EnviroPak Medical Products, 
Inc. ("EnviroPak"), as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Surgical to 
manufacture and market the products (FF13). Pursuant to 
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documentation prepared by Surgical's counsel and at Surgical's 
direction, EnviroPak was incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Surgical (FF14,16). 
Mr. Ninow and Surgical, on September 19, 1991, entered into an 
Organization Agreement to establish EnviroPak (FF15; Exl). This 
Organization Agreement was unique as far as Surgical's dealings with 
its other subsidiaries (R702). The Organization Agreement provided, 
among other things, that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the 
boardf and president of EnviroPak and that EnviroPak would enter into 
an Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneous with 
the execution of the Organization Agreement (FF16; Exl). Mr. Ninow, 
in the negotiations, insisted that EnviroPak have considerable 
autonomy in operation (FF16; R703, 750)} and such a provision was 
inserted in the Organization Agreement (R703; Exl,13). 
At the same time as the Organization Agreement was prepared, Mr. 
Ninow, Surgical and EnviroPak agreed upon an Executive Employment 
Agreement in the form normally used by Surgical (FF19; R757; Ex2). 
That Executive Employment Agreement provides, among other things, 
that Mr. Ninow would serve at the pleasure of, and with such 
additional duties provided by, either EnviroPak or any parent of 
that company (FF20;Ex2). It further provides that Mr. Ninow was 
employed as president, as director, as chairman of the board of 
directors, and as chief operating executive, with "all of the rights, 
powers and obligations normally associated with such position" (FF20; 
Ex2) . 
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In order to enter into the agreements among Surgical, EnviroPak 
and Mr. Ninow, Todd Crosland (son of Surgical's president and 
chairman of the board) signed both the Organization Agreement and the 
Executive Employment Agreement as "president" of EnviroPakf absent 
any resolution of the directors, but with Defendants accepting his 
authority (R688,696-97). 
On the same date the Organization Agreement was signed, Surgical 
prepared and distributed a public news release concerning EnviroPak's 
formation (FF21; Ex5). Surgical always tried to make sure its press 
releases were accurate (R692A), and it was the purpose of that press 
release to tell people what had happened with EnviroPak (R699) . That 
public release referred to Mr. Mr. Ninow's role on behalf of 
EnviroPak as president (as referred to in the Organization Agreement 
and in the Executive Employment Agreement) and as CEO (as referred to 
only in the Executive Employment Agreement) (FF21; R704; Ex5). 
During all times leading to EnviroPak's incorporation, Mr. Ninow 
kept Mr. Diston informed, expecting and understanding that Mr. Diston 
would be employed as a key EnviroPak employee (FF22) . Mr. Nincw 
also showed Mr. Diston a portion of the Organization Agreement 
showing Mr. Ninow's offices as directorf chairman and president of 
EnviroPak (R602, 642, 647) as well as a copy of his own Executive 
Employment Agreement which also showed Mr. Ninow as chief operating 
executive (R760). 
On September 19
 f 1991, the same day as the signing of the 
Organization Agreement and of publication of the public news release, 
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Mr. Ninow, without knowledge of Surgical principals, delivered to Mr. 
Diston a signed Letter of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement (the 
"Employment Agreement") (FF23,26; Ex3). That Employment Agreement 
provided that EnviroPak would employ Mr. Diston for three years 
commencing on or before October 31, 1991, and that Mr. Diston would 
receive a salary of $72,000 per year payable bi-weekly, would receive 
a monthly automobile allowance, would participate in the company's 
stock option program, would receive health and accident insurance, 
would be reimbursed for business expenses, would participate in the 
incentive compensation program, and would receive two weeks paid 
vacation (FF27; Ex3). Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow subsequently agreed 
and clarified that the automobile allowance was to be a fixed $360.00 
per month (FF29; R603, 647, 760) and that Mr. Diston's participation 
in the stock option program would be for 25,000 shares of the total 
100,000 shares allocated from Surgical to EnviroPak for that purpose 
(R604, 619, 761). While Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow contemplated 
subsequent entry into a more formal agreement, consistent with the 
Employment Agreement, both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the 
Employment Agreement to be fully binding on Mr. Diston and on 
EnviroPak (FF28, 32; R760-62, 773). 
Based upon the Organization Agreement and the publication of the 
public news release, Pinnacle and EnviroPak had vested Mr. Ninow with 
authority as chief operating executive, director, chairman of the 
board and president of EnviroPak; it was reasonable for Mr. Diston, 
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under these circumstances, to rely upon the authority of Mr. Ninow to 
bind EnviroPak under the Employment Agreement (FF33). 
Mr. Diston, after receipt of EnviroPak's signed Employment 
Agreement, accepted the terms of that Agreement and informed Mr. 
Ninow that he accepted the agreement (R636, 804) and that he would 
give notice to terminate his employment at Holy Cross Hospital (FF30; 
R606, 762). On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, relying upon 
the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his intent 
to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991 (FF31; R607; 
Ex7). Mr. Diston's reliance on his Employment Agreement with 
EnviroPak, and his termination of employment with Holy Cross 
Hospital, were reasonable under the circumstances (FF34). Both Mr. 
Ninow and Mr. Diston, the persons who negotiated the Employment 
Agreement, have at all times continued to consider the Employment 
Agreement binding upon Mr. Diston and on EnviroPak (FF32; 
R616,634,643,761, 773, 803). EnviroPak, though, breached the 
Employment Agreement (F526). 
After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross Hospital, Mr. 
Diston, for the first time, became aware of disputes between Surgical 
and Mr. Ninow and its effect on Mr. Diston's employment with 
EnviroPak (FF35; R609-10, 809). As a result, Mr. Diston asked Holy 
Cross Hospital if he could receive his job back. Holy Cross 
representatives informed Mr. Diston that Holy Cross had made 
arrangements and commitments with other personnel and was not able to 
reinstate the job (FF36; R610-11) . Mr. Diston subsequently met with 
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Todd B. Crosland and Rockwell P. Schutjer (FF40; R59-60). During 
discussions, these Surgical and EnviroPak representatives offered Mr. 
Diston employment with EnviroPak for $60f000f but without the other 
benefits Mr. Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment 
Agreement (FF40). Moreover, Crosland and Schutjer refused to specify 
the nature of the employment duties, refused to consent to any 
written agreementf and merely offered an employee-at-will agreement 
(FF40; R615, 721). Accordingly, Mr. Diston declined this "offer" 
(F41). Under the circumstancesf Mr. Diston reasonably rejected 
EnviroPak's proposed employment-at-will arrangement (FF42). Mr. 
Diston then obtained employment with FHP Health Caref commencing 
February 24, 1992 (FF45; R577, 617). EnviroPak ceased doing business 
December 31, 1992 (FF43). 
The trial court found, as established by the Findings of Fact, 
that Surgical, as the sole shareholder of EnviroPak, failed to 
observe the separate corporation structures; provided for EnviroPak 
to be seriously undercapitalized, making it illusory and trifling; 
did not observe corporate formalities and separateness; was the sole 
source of funding for EnviroPak; and retained significant control 
over EnviroPak. This resulted in the reasonable and likely potential 
of inequitable results (FF37). As a result, EnviroPak was a hollow 
shell and an alter-ego of Surgical (R52 7). 
The Court, therefore, held the substantive portions of the 
Employment Agreement enforceable, (R526) except that there was 
insufficient evidence to award damages for stock options and 
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incentive bonus (FF49). There being no evidence as to the amount of 
actual car usage to be made in connection with EnviroPak's business, 
the court refused to award damages for the agreed-upon monthly car 
allowance of $360.00 per month (FF50). Since EnviroPak was merely an 
alter-ego of Surgical, the Court ruled that both companies, 
therefore, were jointly and severally liable for the damages to Mr. 
Diston; but the Court awarded damages only to the date EnviroPak 
ceased business and not for the entire term of the Employment 
Agreement. 
The Court entered its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on November 16, 1993f entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
November 18f 1993f in the principal amount of $54f834.60f plus pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest. Defendants filed this appeal, 
and Mr. Diston cross-appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Because the Defendants have failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact, the Defendants have 
not met the necessary standard of review and cannot challenge the 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MR. DISTON'S EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT. 
Mr. Fred Ninow, on behalf of EnviroPak, and pursuant to his 
discussions with John Diston, prepared an employment agreement for 
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Mr. Diston's employment with EnviroPak. That agreement, as clarified 
by the negotiators, provided for a three year employment term, a 
$72,000 annual salary, the times of payment, provisions for potential 
raises, a $360.00 per month car allowance, participation in the 
company's health insurance program, two weeks paid vacation and 
participation in an incentive compensation pool and stock option 
program. Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston also understood and agreed 
that Mr. Diston's role at the company would be as 
director/operations, which included the vice president of quality 
control and production. Mr. Diston, in reliance on that agreement, 
terminated his prior employment with Holy Cross Hospital. 
The Employment Agreement contains all of the essential elements 
of Mr. Diston's employment with EnviroPak and constitutes an 
enforceable agreement. Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston, the parties 
who negotiated the agreement, have consistently considered the 
agreement to be clear and enforceable; and Mr. Diston, in reliance on 
the agreement, terminated his employment with Holy Cross Hospital 
anticipating his employment with EnviroPak pursuant to the negotiated 
Employment Agreement. The terms of the employment agreement, the 
clarification by the parties of the terms not specifically spelled 
out (such as details of the amount of the car allowance and of the 
number of shares involved in the stock option) and Mr. Diston's 
reliance upon and performance under the Employment Agreement 
eliminate any question of unenforceability under the statute of 
frauds. 
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Mr. Ninow negotiated the agreement through the authority given 
him by the Defendants as president, chief operating executive, 
director, and chairman of the board of EnviroPak. These agreed-to 
offices cloak Mr. Ninow with both apparent and actual authority to 
bind EnviroPak to those agreements, and Mr. Diston reasonably relied 
upon Mr. Ninow's authority. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT ENVIROPAK WAS THE ALTER-EGO 
OF SURGICAL, ERRED IN TERMINATING THE DAMAGES AS OF THE DATE 
ENVIROPAK CEASED BUSINESS. 
The trial court found that Surgical, as the sole shareholder of 
EnviroPak, failed to observe the separate corporations' structure; 
provided for EnviroPak to be seriously undercapitalized which made 
the existence of EnviroPak illusory and trifling; did not observe 
corporate formalities and separateness; was the sole source of 
funding for EnviroPak; and retained significant control over 
EnviroPak. As a result, EnviroPak was merely a hollow shell and an 
alter-ego of Surgical. The court, having determined the existence of 
the alter-ego arrangement, though, incorrectly terminated the time 
for calculation of damages to the date EnviroPak ceased to do 
business. Since EnviroPak was merely the alter-ego of Surgical, 
Surgical continues to be liable for EnviroPak's obligations under the 
Employment Agreement throughout the entire term of the agreement. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD THE MONTHLY CAR 
ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT. 
Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed that, as part of Mr. Diston's 
compensation under the Employment Agreement, Mr. Diston would be paid 
a car allowance of $360.00 per month. The trial court, though, 
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incorrectly reading into the contract, wrongfully determined that Mr. 
Diston, in order to be entitled to the car allowance, was obligated 
to prove the percentage of time of the use of the car in connection 
with his employment with EnviroPak. 
The courtf with no factual basis to make the determination, 
incorrectly determined as a matter of law that the car allowance 
required additional evidence and, there being no evidence as to 
percentage of usage, refused to enforce that allowance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Defendants must either accept and rely upon the trial court's 
findings of fact in order to challenge its conclusions of law under 
the proposed "correction of error" standard of review or they must 
directly challenge the trial court's findings of fact under the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. In this case, Defendants 
approach this appeal as a re-trial by presenting the law as they see 
it and asking this Court to apply that law to their version of the 
facts. Defendants have presented many facts that are in conflict 
with the trial court's findings of fact, thereby implicitly 
challenging the trial court's findings of fact and invoking the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. Defendants cannot prevail on 
appeal because they cannot satisfy the applicable standard of review. 
The well-established condition to challenging findings of fact 
is a complete marshalling of the evidence concerning the findings in 
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question. This Court recently summarized this requirement in Robb v. 
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993), as follows: 
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of 
fact, appellant must marshall all the evidence in support 
of the findings and demonstrate "that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefromr is 
insufficient to support the findings...." Grayson Roper 
Ltd. , v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); See also 
fReid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989).] The marshaling requirement provides the meaningful 
and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. West side Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Robb, 863 P.2d at 1328. 
Defendants have provided no basis for this Court to overturn the 
facts upon which the trial court based its conclusions of law. 
Defendants have not identified the findings of fact that they are 
challenging. More importantly, they have not marshalled the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings. Finally, they have not 
demonstrated that the marshaled evidence, and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings, is clearly erroneous, i.e., it is against the 
clear weight of all such evidence and reasonable inferences. See 
Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327-1328, citing Reid, 776 P.2d at 899-900 and 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). As a result, the facts as set forth in 
the court's findings must be affirmed by this Court. See also, 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants have implicitly challenged at least the following 
findings of fact upon which the trial court based its conclusions of 
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law that are the subject of Defendants' appeal: Mr. Diston was to be 
a member of the new company as Director/Operations (F10,22); the 
Organization Agreementf the Executive Employment Agreement and the 
press release made Mr. Ninow director, chairman of the boardf 
president and chief operating executive of EnviroPak, "with all the 
rightsf powers and obligations normally associated with such 
position" (FF16,20,21); EnviroPak was to have considerable autonomy 
in operation (FF16); Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow specified that the 
agreed-on car allowance would be $360.00 per month (Ff29); Mr. Diston 
told Mr. Ninow that he accepted the agreement, that he intended to 
give notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination, and that he 
relied on the Employment Agreement in terminating his Holy Cross 
employment (FF30,31); Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow have always considered 
the Employment Agreement binding (FF32)} Mr. Ninow believed, from the 
agreements with Surgical and EnviroPak, that he had authority to 
execute the Employment Agreement (FF24)} Mr. Diston reasonably relied 
on Mr. Ninow's authority (FF33), and Mr. Diston's reliance on the 
Employment Agreement and his terminating his employment with Holy 
Cross Hospital were reasonable (FF34)} Mr. Diston was not aware of 
any problems with the agreement until after he gave notice to Holy 
Cross (FF35)} Mr. Diston was not able to get his Holy Cross job back 
(FF36); Surgical failed to observe separate corporate structure and 
operation for the two corporations by requiring Mr. Ninow to serve at 
the pleasure of the board of either corporation, by being the sole 
source of funding for EnviroPak, by grossly undercapitalizing 
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EnviroPakf by failing to maintain corporate formalities and 
separateness, and by creating the potential of inequitable results 
(FF37); and Mr. Diston reasonably rejected the subsequent proposed 
"offer" from Surgical and EnviroPak after disputes arose herein 
(FF40,41). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MR. DISTONfS 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT. 
A. The Employment Agreement Contains all Essential Elements and is 
an Enforceable Contract. 
Defendants challenge the Employment Agreement as insufficiently 
detailed and lacking essential elements to constitute an enforceable 
agreement. This assertion, though, is contrary to the findings in 
this case. The Defendants' assertion that the Employment Agreement 
lacks essential elements and details flies in the face of the trial 
court's specific conclusion — after hearing the evidence — that the 
Employment Agreement did contain the essential provisions of that 
employment arrangement and that it was a valid agreement (R526). 
It is also significant that the Defendants rejected that 
agreement before they had even read its terms (R713, 715-17), raises 
questions regarding Defendants' credibility as they argue against the 
Employment Agreement's supposed indefiniteness or unenforceability, 
before they had even read its terms. Regardless, Defendants' 
position ignores the Court's findings as to the written terms of the 
agreement itself andf also, the oral understandings and agreements to 
clarify it and Mr. Diston's reasonable reliance thereon. 
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Mr. Diston's employment agreement with EnviroPak addressed all 
the essential elements and economic arrangements required in an 
employment agreement between parties — the parties had agreed upon 
the three-year term of the agreement, the $72,000 annual salary, the 
number and times the annual salary would be paidf potential raisesf 
a car allowance, participation in the company's health insurance 
program, two weeks paid vacation, and participation in an incentive 
compensation pool and stock option program (FF27). Prior to Mr. 
Diston's acceptance of his Employment Agreement and his giving notice 
to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination of that employment, Mr. 
Diston and Mr. Ninow agreed that the car allowance was to be $360.00 
per month (FF29; R603,647,760). They further agreed that Mr. 
Diston's participation in the stock option program would be for 
25,000 shares of the total 100,000 shares allocated from Surgical to 
EnviroPak for that purpose (R604,619,761). 
With such specificity in the Agreement, as undisputedly 
testified to the negotiating parties, one may fairly ask what 
essential elements were not agreed to between the parties. 
To determine the nature of an employment contract, courts 
require that the parties' intent and the totality of the 
circumstances be considered. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community 
Action Program, 775 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1989). 
Defendants, alleging that the Employment Agreement is only an 
agreement to agree, cite Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962) 
for the proposition that a contract can be enforced only if the 
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obligations are set forth with sufficient definiteness in the 
writing. In Bunnell, it was argued that there was at most, an 
"agreement to agree" because the terms were not set forth with 
specificity. However, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
[W]hen the receipt is interpreted under the circumstances 
that existed at the time of its creation, and in light of 
the conduct and statements of the parties, it is clear that 
the transfer of Bunnell's property was intended as part of 
the whole agreement. The fact that part of the performance 
is that the parties will enter into a contract in the 
future does not render the original agreement any less 
binding. (Citations omitted). 
Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 600. 
Furthermore, it is well settled that an agreement to make a 
written contact, where the terms are mutually understood and agreed 
to in all respects, is as binding as a more detailed written 
agreement would have been were it subsequently accepted. 
Anderson v. Board of Trustees, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Wy. 1984). Even 
if a contract contains a promise to agree, its enforceability 
depends on the relative importance and severability of the matters 
left to the future and is a question of degree to be settled by 
determining whether the terms to be decided in the future are so 
essential to the bargain that to enforce the promise strictly 
according to the settled terms would make the arrangement unfair. 
"Where the matters left for the future are unessential, each party 
will be forced to accept a reasonable determination ..." Coleman 
Engineering v. North American Aviation, 420 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 
1966). See also, Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 657 P.2d 1 
(Idaho 1983) . 
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B. Both Parties who Negotiated the Employment Agreement Intended, 
and Consider, the Agreement to be Binding. 
The trial court found, upon consideration of all testimony and 
evidence, that the parties who negotiated the Employment Agreement 
intended it to be enforceable and, indeed, continue to consider it to 
be enforceable and binding (FF32; R616, 634, 643, 761, 773, 803). 
This case, therefore, differs from the normal dispute wherein one of 
the actual negotiating parties disputes an agreement's 
enforceability. Defendants in this case, attempting to overcome the 
negotiating parties' contrary testimony, take selected portions of 
that testimony out of context to assert that the negotiating parties 
really did not mean what they say they meant. Defendants, for 
example, quote selected testimony referring to the expectation that 
a subsequent, more formal, form of the agreement would be prepared. 
In doing so, Defendants ignore the consistent testimony that the 
Employment Agreement was considered binding and that any subsequent 
document was not a renegotiation of terms but, rather, would be 
solely to state the already agreed terms into a more formal form 
(R634). Defendants ignore the fact that, if Mr. Diston did not 
consider the agreement enforceable, he would not have quit his 
existing job with which he was happy (R579). Defendants, quoting 
selected testimony of Mr. Diston, also ignore Mr. Diston's other 
testimony: 
Q (By Mr. Sabin) What was your attitude, as far as the 
agreement that you had entered into with Fred Ninow? 
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A I told — I made the comment to them at that time that this 
did not spell out what is in my agreement. This is the agreement 
that they need to live up to. . . (R616) 
Q Now, when Mr. Ninow gave you the letter of intent, and I 
think you have testified it was some time within a day or two of 
September 20th; is that right? 
A Right. 
Q Did you contemplate at that time that there would be a more 
detailed agreement entered into? 
A Uh—yes. I felt with the provisions that were in our 
original agreement, yes. 
Q And so you expected a written agreement at some point in the 
future? 
A Yes. I felt that a little bit more formalized, yes. 
Q You testified this morning, I think, that you and Fred 
discussed it right then that same day that he gave you the letter of 
intent? 
A Well, of course. 
Q And you discussed a car allowance and all those things? 
A Of course. 
Q Why didn't you just write them down on the letter of intent, 
at that time? 
A I felt it was a legal document and I didn't want to scribble 
on that document. (R634) 
Q And did you then make inquiries yourself about whether you 
would be employed on the terms set forth in your letter of intent? 
A No. I assumed that I would be. (R643) 
Defendants also ignore Mr. Ninow's similar testimony which is 
consistent with Mr. Diston's understanding: 
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Q Was there any other discussion with John concerning the 
letter of intent? 
A Yes. We discussed that it would. I showed him a copy of my 
employment agreement, and I told him that we would eventually have 
some type of another document that would be exactly like mine or very 
similar to mine, with some changes, of course, reflecting the 
arrangement. 
Q Would it have changed the terms of what was in this letter of 
intent? 
A. No. (R760) 
C. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Render the Employment Agreement 
Unenforceable. 
Defendants argue and, indeed, seem to imply that as a matter of 
law, that the statute of frauds precludes enforcement of the 
Employment Agreement. Defendants ignore the pertinent language of 
the statute of frauds: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4 (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Defendants' assertion as to applicability of the statute of 
frauds also ignores the exception to the statute of frauds through 
Mr. Diston's part performance of the Employment Agreement. The 
pertinent language is: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-8. 
Mr. Diston quit his job with Holy Cross Hospital in order to 
begin his employment with EnviroPak (FF30,31) , and was unable to get 
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that job back (FF35,36), when he later discovered there was a 
problem. Even absent the specificity of the written agreementf this 
partial performance "allows a court of equity to enforce an oral 
agreement, if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding the 
statute." Martin v. Scholl, 678, P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). 
The writing which evidences the parties' intent and entry into 
an enforceable agreement does not have to be a perfect written 
agreement. In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 
1988), this Court enforced a finder's agreement despite protestations 
that the statute of frauds precluded its enforcement because of 
ambiguities in the agreement. This Court stated: 
In the present case, the written contract concerning 
the finder's agreement between the parties was a sufficient 
"note or memorandum" of the parties' agreement to satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds provision of Section 25-5-4(5). The 
contract includes the critical terms of the finder's 
agreement: it identifies the finder, the finder's clients, 
the property owner who will owe a commission to the finder 
if a transaction is closed with any of the finder's 
clients, and the commission rate . . . . [t]his agreement 
is ambiguous in one respect, namely, whether it applies to 
all properties sold by the owner to the finder's clients or 
just to certain properties. 
Finding such an agreement to be a "sufficient note or 
memorandum, is not inconsistent with the Statute of 
Frauds." As one commentator has recognized: 
[N]o writing or memorandum can ever be the 
complete and perfect witness sufficient in 
itself to establish the contract and its terms 
It seems clear that parole evidence is 
admissible to explain and apply a note or 
memorandum of an oral contract within the 
statute of frauds whenever it would be 
admissible for the purpose of interpreting or 
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determining the operation of an integrated 
contract or a writing that purports to be the 
operative expression of the will of its creator. 
Indeed, oral evidence is admitted with 
considerably greater liberality in cases under 
the statute than in cases of integrated 
contracts. 
If the contract is ambiguous, "extrinsic evidence as 
to the parties' intent must be received and considered in 
an effort to glean what the parties actually agreed to." 
(Citations omitted) C.J. Realty, Inc., 758 P.2d at 928-
929. 
It is illustrative to sample other Utah cases in which the 
courts have found "ambiguous" contracts to be binding: Barker v. 
Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987) [upholding an earnest money 
agreement permitting extraneous evidence to specify the property 
description]; Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock 
Co., Inc., 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1985) [reversing the lower court's 
holding of unenforceability and remanding for findings of fact]; Reid 
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) [enforcing a realty sale contract 
despite lack of specificity in property descriptions]; Estate of 
Bonnie, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979) [sustaining the quieting of title by 
considering together three receipts as a sufficient memoranda to 
satisfy the statute of frauds and permitting the exact description of 
property to be determined by parole evidence]; Bunnell, supra, 
[upholding an earnest money receipt when part of the performance was 
to be entered into in the future]; Ney v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 
(Utah 1956) [upholding a commission under an earnest money receipt 
and a listing agreement after considering the oral agreement for 
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payment of commission]; Abba v. Smyth, 59 P. 756 (1899) [admitting 
parole evidence to permit enforcement of an oral agreement for 
employment]. 
Similar cases from other jurisdictions are also instructive. In 
Air Service Co. v. Sheehan, 594 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Nevada 1979), the 
court addressed a situation analogous to the case at bar. The 
parties had negotiated a contract to employ the plaintiff. And the 
plaintiff, in reliance upon that contractual agreementf had quit his 
job. Subsequentlyf the defendant refused to sign the documents and 
perform part of the contract. The court found that the parties had 
reached a complete oral agreement by which they were bound. 
Likewisef in Sucia v. Amfac Dist, 675 P.2d 1333 (Ariz. App. 1983), 
the defendants argued thatf because an employment agreement did not 
detail the services to be performed or specify whether the employee 
was considered full or part-time, there was no meeting of the minds. 
The parties had agreed on a salary of $40,000 per year, a car, group 
health and life insurance and 30 percent of the stock. The court 
held that employment contracts need not detail every condition of the 
employment and that the contract was sufficiently definite to be 
enforceable. 
Defendants' supporting cases, contrary to the case at hand, 
arise where there was no written memorandum or where the contracts 
lacked essential elements. See, e.g., Machan Hamshire Properties, 
Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230 (Utah 
App. 1989), [no written memorandum acknowledging or recognizing an 
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oral contract]; Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 
1988) [no enforcement of an easement or price absent a written memo]; 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) [solely an oral contract 
to sell real property]; Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving Place 
Associates, Inc., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980) [clear evidence that the 
parties did not intend legal consequences absent future formal 
written commitment]; Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1980) [refusal to enforce rights not supported by a contract]; 
Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973), [lands not specified]; 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961)f [purported "side 
agreement" absent written memorandum]; Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining 
Co. , 242 P.2d 578 (Utah 1952) [oral sublease without rent specified]; 
Collette v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951) [oral agreement only]; 
Beehive Brick v. Robinson Brick Company, 780 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. Utah 
1989)f [order not authenticated by other party]. 
Accordingly, Defendants' authorities are not persuasive in the 
present case. 
D. Mr. Ninow Had Both Actual and Apparent Authority to Bind 
EnviroPak, Making it Reasonable for Mr. Diston to Rely Upon Mr. 
Ninow's Authority. 
It was reasonable, as the trial court found (FF33) , for Mr. 
Diston to rely upon the authority of Mr. Ninow because he was clothed 
with all indicia of the authority to control and bind EnviroPak; that 
is, he was identified as its president, director, chairman of the 
board of directors and chief operating executive. Mr. Ninow had 
showed Mr. Diston the relevant part of the Organization Agreement 
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and, alsof his own Employment Agreement (R602,642,647,760) . For this 
reason, Mr. Diston could reasonably rely upon Mr. Ninow's authority 
and, because of Mr. Ninow's actual and apparent agency on behalf of 
EnviroPak, could rely upon the legitimacy of the Employment 
Agreement. The court did, in fact, conclude from the evidence that 
Mr. Ninow in this case did have the apparent authority, and Mr. 
Diston relied on that authority, to enter into the Employment 
Agreement (R526). The evidence fully supported those findings. 
Mr. Ninow insisted that EnviroPak be largely autonomous (FF16; 
R703,750). That he had prevailed and obtained concurrence by 
Surgical was reflected in both the Organization Agreement and the 
Executive Employment Agreement, whereby Mr. Ninow was granted 
virtually unlimited authority as president, director, chairman of the 
board of directors and chief operating executive "with all of the 
rights, powers and obligations normally associated with such 
position." (Ex2). 
Given the Defendants' sophistication in business and their 
counsel's preparation of the agreements with their approval, it can 
be presumed that the degree of autonomy and power of authority given 
Mr. Ninow were not lightly considered but, rather, were integral 
parts of the business relationship. Hence, Surgical and EnviroPak 
deferred or acquiesced to Mr. Ninow's important powers and authority 
allowing him to undertake such actions as executing the Employment 
Agreement. Surgical's counsel prepared the Organization Agreement 
and the Executive Employment Agreement, which has been negotiated 
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between Surgical and Mr. Ninow and which empowered Mr. Ninow to take 
actions (FF14). Surgical also publicized Mr. Ninow's role with 
EnviroPak (FF21;Ex5). Surgical, a publicly traded company with 
various subsidiaries, presumably had both sophisticated principals 
and counsel. One may fairly presume that Surgical's principals and 
legal counsel intended that, and knewf the language in the agreements 
would control. The Defendants, therefore, have a hollow ring to 
their argument that they had nothing to do with Mr. Diston relying on 
Mr. Ninow's authority. The Defendants lit the fuse and now complain 
about the explosion. 
The Defendants' argument as to Mr. Ninow's supposed lack of 
authority is particularly disingenuous when it is remembered that 
Surgical itself had previously recognized Todd Crosland's authority 
as president to sign on behalf of EnviroPak, absent any resolution by 
the board of Directors (the board not even yet being formed) and 
absent his holding any other office in the corporation at that time. 
(R696-97). Yet Defendants dispute the binding signature of the 
person who the Defendants agreed was the president and director and 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer of EnviroPak. 
Ignoring, for sake of argument, the Defendant's prior 
recognition of Todd Crosland's authority as president to sign the 
agreements with Mr. Ninow, and if Mr. Ninow had simply held a single 
office, such as president, Defendants might have some argument as to 
the scope of his authority. In some jurisdictions, the president of 
a corporation has no authority to enter into employment contracts or 
30641. DI783.2 26 
agencies merely by virtue of his office. In other jurisdictions, 
though, the president has prima facie authority to make a contract on 
behalf of the corporation for the employment of the services of 
others. For instance, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated: 
As to defendants' contention that Reed made the promise to 
pay the $150.00 per month personally, this record is to the 
contrary. He at all times was president of the defendant 
corporation and as its principal administrative officer 
bound the company for activities within the scope of his 
authority which would include the hiring of employees. 
(Citations omitted). 
Skvland Food Corp. v. Meier, 382 P.2d 996, 998 (Colo. 1963). 
When, though, the president is also the business head of a 
corporation, such as general manager or chief operating officer, as 
Mr. Ninow' is in this case, contracts of employment or agency are 
within the scope of his authority. The president of a corporation 
who is also a general manager having power to superintend and conduct 
its business has implied authority to make any contract appropriate 
in the ordinary course of its business; and in such cases, his powers 
are greater than he would have as president alone. See Memorial 
Hospital Assoc, v. Pacific Grape, 45 Cal.2d 634, 290 P.2d 481 (Cal. 
1955) . 
More recently, the court in GM Development Corporation v. 
Community Mortgage Corp., 795 P.2d 827 (Ariz. App. 1990). explained: 
. . . . In the instant case, it is undisputed that Shares 
[guarantor] selected Beck to be president, chief executive 
officer, and chairman of its board of directors. By placing 
him in the three most powerful positions within its 
corporate management structure, we conclude that Shares 
held Beck out as possessing authority to act on its behalf. 
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Although the title given an officer of a corporation is not 
determinative of his authority, when he is clothed with 
titles implying general powers (i.e., president, chief 
executive officer and chairman of the board)f the business 
public and courts may fairly presume that he is what the 
corporation holds him out to be. 
GM Development Corp, 795 P.2d at 833. 
Mr. Ninow not only was a director but, also, had the right under 
the Organization Agreement to appoint a second director, sufficient 
to comprise his control of 50% of the board of directors of EnviroPak 
(Exl, 13). He also was designated as chairman of that board, 
president and chief operating executive. It stretches credulity to 
presume Mr. Ninow had no authority to act on behalf of the company or 
that Mr. Diston had no legitimate basis to rely upon Mr. Ninow's 
express and apparent authority. The trial court's conclusions on 
these issues are amply supported by the facts in evidence and the 
pertinent law and authorities. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT ENVIROPAK WAS THE ALTER-EGO 
OF SURGICAL, ERRED IN TERMINATING THE DAMAGES AS OF THE DATE 
ENVIROPAK CEASED BUSINESS. 
Mr. Diston has cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court 
correctly determined that EnviroPak and Surgical were alter-egos but 
erred in terminating damages as of the date EnviroPak ceased 
business. Instead, the trial court should have held Surgical liable 
for all of the damages arising out of the breach throughout the 
entire term of the Employment Agreement. The trial court improperly 
limited the term of the contract to fourteen months instead of three 
years. 
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The trial court's two stated reason for limiting damages were 
that EnviroPak ceased business on December 31f 1992 (FF43) and that 
the contracting parties knew there was considerable risk that the 
business would fail (FF48). In so altering the employment contract, 
the trial court misapplied the alter ego doctrine. The court had 
already determined that EnviroPak was indeed the alter ego of 
Surgical. Therefore, it was Surgical that legally entered into the 
employment contract with Mr. Diston. Surgical did not go out of 
existence on December 31, 1992, but continues in existence today. 
Furthermore, even if Surgical had gone out of business with its alter 
ego, EnviroPak, on December 31, 1992, it would have still been liable 
for breach of the employment contract.2 The trial court's limiting 
the damages was, clearly, unjustified. 
The alter ego doctrine is well defined by Utah case law. This 
Court has described the alter ego doctrine as follows: 
Under the equitable "alter ego" doctrine as it originally 
evolved, courts would, on a proper showing, disregard the 
integrity of the corporation and view a controlling 
shareholder as indistinguishable from the corporation, 
thereby permitting creditors of the corporation to reach 
the assets of a controlling shareholder. This was done to 
prevent the legal separation between the corporation and 
the controlling shareholder or shareholders from being used 
2
 Certainly, Mr. Diston, in such a scenario, would have 
been obligated to mitigate his damages by seeking other employment 
after the Defendants breached his contract. And in fact, that is 
what he did in this case (FF45). 
Almost all of Utah's case law, and also that of other 
jurisdictions, has been created by appeals challenging the 
applicability of the alter ego doctrine. Its effect, on the other 
hand, is inherently straight forward, and little case law directly 
addresses the effect itself. 
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to perpetuate an injustice on third parties. (Citations 
omitted). 
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
The rationale used by courts in permitting the corporate 
veil to be pierced is that if principle shareholder or 
owner conducts his private and corporate business on an 
interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, he is 
without standing to complain when an injured party does the 
same. ... A court of equity looks through form to substance 
and has often disregarded the corporate form when it was 
fiction in fact and deed and was merely serving the 
personal use and convenience of the owner. (Citations 
omitted). 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987). 
"Alter ego," according to Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition 
(1979), means "second self." The two entities are treated as one. 
This is done, as explained above in Transamerica Cash Reserve and 
Colman, by "piercing the corporate veil," i.e., by disregarding the 
legal fiction of the separate corporate entity. Thus when the trial 
court found that EnviroPak was the alter ego of Surgical, EnviroPak's 
corporate identity was disregarded and Surgical became responsible 
and liable for EnviroPak's breach of contract. There are no legally 
recognizable grounds for altering the terms of Mr. Diston's 
employment contract based upon one company's ceasing business after 
it has been determined that the alter ego doctrine is applicable. 
The terms establishing the three year duration and the compensation 
and benefits thereunder must be applied to Surgical the same as they 
would be applied to EnviroPak because the legal fiction of separate 
corporate identities no longer exists. 
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A similar 1971 Utah Supreme Court case supports this principle. 
In Chatterlv v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971), twelve former 
employees of a subsidiary corporation which had ceased business 
operations (and which obviously had no assets) sued the parent 
corporation for unpaid wages, severance payf and other benefits. The 
trial court found that the alter ego doctrine was applicable and 
therefore held the parent corporation liable for the damages. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
[The parent corporation] should not be permitted to manage 
and operate a business from which it stands to gain 
whatever profit may be made, have the advantage of the 
efforts of those who serve it, and then use the 
nomenclature of another corporation as a facade to insulate 
it from the responsibility for paying for those services. 
Chatterlv, 485 P. 2d at 670. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
applicability of the alter ego doctrine and thereby also affirmed the 
judgment for the unpaid wages, severance pay, and other benefits. In 
so doing, the Court inherently recognized that the parent was liable 
for the obligations of its alter ego even though the alter ego no 
longer existed.3 That is where the trial court erred in the instant 
case. The fact that EnviroPak went out of business does not 
extinguish its liabilities. To hold otherwise would allow parent 
corporations to circumvent and avoid contractual obligations at will 
3
 The details concerning the nature of the unpaid 
employment obligations are not given in that case. It is probably 
safe to assume that the unpaid wages were for hours already worked 
and that the twelve employees were under an employment at will 
contract. In the instant case, however, Mr. Diston's employment 
contract was for a definite and fixed term of three years and the 
balance of the term is not extinguished merely by the fact that the 
alter ego ceased to exist. 
30641.DI783.2 31 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD THE MONTHLY CAR 
ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT. 
Mr. Diston also appeals the trial court's refusal to award car 
allowance amounts as part of the damages for the breach of contract. 
The trial court's refusal is not based on lack of agreement. Rather, 
the court, without the Defendants having raised this issue, based his 
determination solely upon Mr. Diston's failure to present to the 
Court evidence as to the percentage of time or use of the car in 
connection with Mr. Diston's employment required by the agreement 
(FF50). In this conclusionf the trial court erred. 
The Court
 f based upon the testimony, found that, as part of the 
agreement, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed that Mr. Diston would 
receive a monthly automobile allowance. The Court further found that 
Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed that that amount would be 
$360.00 per month. Having found the provisions of the agreement 
unambiguousf having held the agreement itself enforceable, and having 
found a breach of the agreement by the Defendants, the trial court 
improperly read into the contract conditions precedent to Mr. 
Diston's entitlement to the car allowance, which were not part of the 
agreement. 
No evidence was before the court suggesting that any conditions 
precedent were contracted or even contemplated. Rather, the 
undisputed evidence was that the car allowance was for a fixed amount 
for a fixed period. Mr. Diston was to receive an automobile 
allowance as part of his compensation, but since he had recently 
purchased an automobile, the amount of the car allowance was set to 
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approximate his existing car payment (R603) . Based upon the 
undisputed testimony alone, Mr. Diston is entitled to have the 
$360.00 per month car allowance added as part of the damages for 
breach of contract. 
The trial court overlooked the fact that negotiation of 
employment compensation typically involves the payment of more than 
simply wages, i.e.. health insurance, disability insurance, life 
insurance, automobile arrangementsf "golden parachute" provisions, 
retirement arrangements and expense accounts. Fringe benefits are a 
common form of compensation for employees and, unless otherwise 
provided in the tax lawsf are included as gross income to the 
employee (§61(a)(l) Internal Revenue Code of 1986) and normally 
deductible to the employer as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses (§162 Internal Revenue Code of 1986). Included in common 
examples of fringe benefits are an employer-provided automobile (IRS 
Regs. §1.61-21(a)(1)). The obligation would be Mr. Diston's to 
justify any tax return deduction he may claim on his tax return (IRS 
Regs. § 1.162-1). 
It is no more logical or just for the trial court to require 
extraneous evidence of Mr. Diston's anticipated mileage use than it 
would be for the court to read into an employment contract: amount of 
illness anticipated to be caused by work to justify health insurance, 
anticipated future work-caused disability to justify disability 
insurance, absolute number of hours to be worked to justify a salary 
versus an hourly payment for an employee, or amount of hours spent to 
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justify an annual two-week vacation. For this reason, the trial 
court's denial of this benefit should be reversed, and Mr. Diston 
should be awarded the $360.00 car allowance for each month during the 
contract period. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court found, supported by an abundance of evidence, 
the existence of an employment agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. 
Diston which contained all of the essential elements of an agreement 
and which was an enforceable agreement. The trial court further 
found that Mr. Ninow was, by the Defendants' agreements, clothed with 
the authority to enter into that agreement and to bind EnviroPak in 
that matter. The trial court further appropriately found the 
existence of an alter-ego arrangement between Surgical and EnviroPak. 
The Defendants have not marshalled the evidence to challenge the 
legitimacy and reasonableness of the trial court's findings and, 
accordingly, the findings must be affirmed on appeal. The court's 
conclusions of law and judgment should also be affirmed. 
The trial court, however, erred in terminating Mr. Diston's 
damages as of the date that EnviroPak ceased doing business, even 
though Surgical continued in business. Mr. Diston should be awarded 
damages for the entire thirty-six period of the breached contract 
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andf further, should have included within those damages the amount of 
the agreed-upon car allowance of $360.00 per month, 
DATED this ^ 7 day of May, 1994 
Neil R. Sabin 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
John Diston 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid this <f_J_ 
day of May, 1994 to the offices of the following counsel of record: 
/r 
Ellen Maycock 
David C. Wright 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
800 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab A 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DISTON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation, and ; 
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ] 
formerly PINNACLE ] 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a ] 
Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendants. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920902269CN 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July 
20, 1993, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable David 
Roth, Judge, presiding and hearing all evidence. Plaintiff 
appeared in person by and through his attorney, Neil R. Sabin. 
The Defendants appeared through their representatives and their 
attorney, Ellen Maycock. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings and documents on file herein, having heard testimony 
and observed and considered the respective credibility and the 
testimony of the witnesses, having heard arguments and reviewed 
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memoranda and documentation submitted by the parties, and being 
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, John Diston ("Mr. Diston") is an individual 
and resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. 
("EnviroPak"), was incorporated as a Utah corporation and at all 
times relevant herein had its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical"), is 
a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. Surgical was formerly known as Pinnacle 
Environmental, Inc. The name of that corporation was changed to 
its current name April 15, 1992. At all relevant times, Pinnacle 
was qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
4. Surgical is a public company, having various 
subsidiaries. 
5. Mr. Diston was employed at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, from 1977 until October 31, 1991. As of the 
termination of this employment, his title was Assistant Director 
of Peri-Operative Services. 
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6. During late 1990 and early 1991, Frederick P. Ninow 
("Mr. Ninow") was associated with a company called Professional 
Medical. 
7. While associated with Professional Medical, Mr. Ninow 
undertook planning and efforts anticipating Professional 
Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged 
supply packets featuring principal components that are laundered, 
sterilized and pre-packed for repeated use in surgical and other 
health care procedures (the "Product"). 
8. Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston became acquainted while Mr. 
Ninow was investigating the anticipated Product and the nature of 
a possible market for that Product. 
9. When Professional Medical was unwilling or unable to 
attempt to market the Product on a large scale, Mr. Ninow decided 
to leave Professional Medical, to form his own company and to 
raise money for marketing the Product. 
10. During this time, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston began 
discussing their respective roles with that new company, with the 
understanding that Mr. Diston was to be a member of that new 
company and to serve as Director/Operations. Preliminary 
discussions were also made with other persons for future 
involvement with the new company. 
11. During that time, Mr. Ninow, with some input from Mr. 
Diston and others, wrote a rough and general business plan 
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regarding the proposed company financing, operation and marketing 
of the Product. 
12. Mr. Ninow was acquainted with a son of Rex Crosland, 
chairman of Surgical. As a result of discussions between those 
persons, Mr. Ninow became introduced to principals of Surgical, 
including Rex Crosland, Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer in 
the Summer of 1991, several months after his association began 
with Mr. Diston. 
13. Pursuant to the discussions between Mr. Ninow and the 
Surgical representatives, those parties agreed to establish 
EnviroPak, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Surgical, for 
marketing of the Product. 
14. Surgical caused Surgical's counsel to prepare the 
Articles of Incorporation for EnviroPak, an Organization 
Agreement among Surgical, EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, and an 
Employment Agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow. 
15. Mr. Ninow, EnviroPak and Surgical, as the sole 
shareholder of EnviroPak, executed the Organization Agreement, 
dated September 19, 1991. 
16. The Organization Agreement provided, among other 
things, that: EnviroPak was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Surgical; that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the board 
and president of EnviroPak; that EnviroPak would enter into an 
Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneously 
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with the execution of the Organization Agreement; that Mr. Ninow 
assigned to EnviroPak his business plan; that Surgical could 
designate two directors of EnviroPak; that Mr, Ninow could also 
choose another director of EnviroPak; and that EnviroPak would 
have considerable autonomy of operation. 
17. Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer served as directors 
of EnviroPak as designated by Surgical. 
18. The Organization Agreement was silent on the issue of 
whether Mr. Ninow had the authority to hire employees for 
EnviroPak and to make a commitment for any particular salary. 
19. The parties executed an Executive Employment Agreement, 
between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, also prepared by EnviroPak*s 
counsel. This was subsequently executed. 
20. The Executive Employment Agreement provided that Mr. 
Ninow was employed by EnviroPak as president, as director, as 
chairman of the board of directors, and as chief operating 
officer "with all of the rights, powers and obligations normally 
associated with such position." 
21. On September 19, 1991, the same date as the 
Organization Agreement, Surgical prepared and caused release of a 
news release regarding the formation of EnviroPak and, in that 
release, referred to Mr. Ninow as "EnviroPak President and CEO." 
22. Throughout his discussions with Surgical, Mr. Ninow 
advised Mr. Diston as to the nature of Mr. Ninow1s discussions 
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with Surgical, since both individuals expected Mr. Diston to be 
part of the company marketing the Product. 
23. There was no evidence that Rockwell Schutjer or Todd 
Crosland knew Mr. Ninow had offered employment to Mr. Diston 
until after execution of the letter of intent between EnviroPak 
and Mr. Diston. 
24. Because of Mr. Ninow1s specific responsibilities with 
EnviroPak, pursuant to the Organization Agreement and the 
Executive Employment Agreement, Mr. Ninow believed that he had 
the authority to enter into an employment arrangement with Mr. 
Diston. 
25. Mr. Ninow delivered the letter of intent to Mr. Diston 
and, also, delivered a letter of intent to Rochelle Mills-LaRocco 
on or about September 20, 1991. 
26. Pursuant to Mr. Diston's and Mr. Ninow's discussions, 
on September 20, 1991, Mr. Ninow, signing as the "duly authorized 
officer" of EnviroPak, executed a Letter of Intent to Enter 
Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") with Mr. Diston 
as the employee. 
27. The Employment Agreement provided that Mr. Diston would 
be employed for three years commencing on or before October 31, 
1991; would receive a salary of $72,000 per year, payable bi-
weekly; would receive a monthly automobile allowance; would 
participate in the company's stock option program; would receive 
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health and accident insurance; would be reimbursed for business 
expenses; would participate in the incentive compensation 
program; and would receive two weeks paid vacation. 
28. Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow both contemplated that Mr. 
Diston would enter into a formal, complete employment agreement, 
consistent with the Letter of Intent, at a later time. 
29. After preparation of the Employment Agreement, Mr. 
Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed to a $360.00 per month 
automobile allowance for Mr. Diston. 
30. Mr. Diston informed Mr. Ninow that he accepted that 
agreement and that he intended to give notice to terminate his 
employment at Holy Cross Hospital. 
31. On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, in reliance on 
the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his 
intent to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991. 
32. Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the Employment 
Agreement fully binding upon Mr. Diston and EnviroPak. 
33. Because of the acts of EnviroPak and Pinnacle in 
drafting the Organization Agreement, Employment Agreement and 
issuing the press release, Mr. Ninow believed he had the 
authority to execute the Letter of Intent. Under the 
circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Mr. Diston to 
rely on Mr. Ninow's authority. 
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34. Mr. Distort1 s reliance on the Letter of Intent and 
giving notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination were 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
35. After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross 
Hospital, Mr. Diston became aware of problems between Mr. Ninow 
and Surgical. Mr. Diston was, for the first time, informed of 
problems affecting the job. 
36. Mr. Diston asked Holy Cross Hospital whether he could 
receive his job back. He was told, however, that Holy Cross 
Hospital had made arrangements and commitments with other 
personnel and, accordingly, it was not possible to get the job 
back. 
37. Surgical, as the sole shareholder of EnviroPak failed 
to observe the separate corporation structure format and 
operation of EnviroPak which included at least the following: 
a. Under paragraph 3 of the Employment Agreement, Mr. 
Ninow served at the pleasure of the board of either Surgical 
or EnviroPak, suggesting that Surgical retained significant 
control over EnviroPak. 
b. Surgical was the sole entity and source of the 
funding of the business and anticipated business of 
EnviroPak. 
c. EnviroPak was capitalized with only $1,000 
capital, which was grossly undercapitalized for the 
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anticipated business of this type and illusory or trifling 
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss. 
d. The corporate formalities were not observed 
between Surgical and EnviroPak. The failure to maintain the 
corporate formalities and separateness reasonably and likely 
created the potential of inequitable results leaving 
EnviroPak totally dependent upon Surgical. 
38. Disputes arose between persons who were representatives 
of Surgical and EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow. Pursuant to these 
disputes, Mr. Ninow, before December 10, 1991, was terminated 
for, among other things, failing to consult with the board of 
directors of EnviroPak on important decisions, including whether 
to hire employees. 
39. Given the nature of the disputes and the actions of Mr. 
Ninow, it is not unreasonable to determine that Mr. Ninow should 
have been fired in this case. 
40. Mr. Diston subsequently met with Todd B. Crosland and 
Rockwell P. Schutjer. During discussions, these Surgical and 
EnviroPak representatives offered Mr. Diston employment with 
EnviroPak for $60,000, but without the other benefits which Mr. 
Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment 
Agreement. Moreover, they refused to provide any specificity of 
the job or any written agreement. 
41. As a result, Mr. Diston refused the above job offer. 
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42. Mr. Diston, having measured the risks of a three year 
contract which was not honored, together with the risks of a 
contract offered by Pinnacle without a time period and as an 
employee at will contract, was reasonable in rejecting the offer. 
43. EnviroPak ceased business operations effective December 
31, 1992. 
44. Insufficient evidence exists for the court to determine 
that Pinnacle purposely, or negligently, was responsible for the 
failure of the business of EnviroPak. 
45. Mr. Diston was unemployed from October 31, 1991, until 
February 24, 1992, at which time he became employed with FHP 
Health Care where he continues to be employed. 
46. From February 24, 1992, until December 31 1992, Mr. 
Diston earned $29,165.40 as gross income. 
47. The difference between what Mr. Diston earned from 
October 31, 1991, through December 31, 1992, and what Mr. Diston 
was to be paid under the Employment Agreement was $54,834.60. 
48. Mr. Diston reasonably could not be expected to be 
entitled to damages beyond the date of December 31, 1992, because 
the business ceased to exist and the parties understood at the 
time of entry of their agreement that it was a risky undertaking. 
49. Insufficient evidence exists with respect to the terms 
and calculations of any damages for failure of stock options and 
for incentive bonuses. 
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50. With respect to the monthly car allowance, no evidence 
is before the Court as to what percentage of time or use the Mr. 
Diston was required to use the car in connection with his 
Employment with EnviroPak. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Ninow had the apparent authority to enter into the 
Employment Agreement with Mr. Diston. 
2. Mr. Diston reasonably relied upon Mr. Ninow's apparent 
authority to enter into the Employment Agreement. 
3. Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed on the essential 
provisions of the Letter of Intent to the extent that it provided 
for an offer of employment of a term of years and for a specific 
salary and, hence, there existed a valid agreement between 
EnviroPak and Mr. Diston. 
4. Because of the understandings and agreements contained 
in the Letter of Intent, and the reliance of Mr. Diston on the 
contract, the statute of frauds does not apply; and the 
Employment Agreement constitutes an enforceable agreement. 
5. Mr. Diston was ready and willing to perform under the 
Employment Agreement and was not in breach thereof. 
6. EnviroPak breached the Employment Agreement with Mr. 
Diston and refused to perform thereunder. 
7. Because there existed such a unity of interest between 
Surgical and EnviroPak and the failure to observe separate 
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corporate form, such arrangements sanctioned the possibility of 
fraud or otherwise promoted injustice; EnviroPak was a hollow 
shell and not a viable entity; and EnviroPak was an alter ego of 
Surgical. 
8. As a result, the breach of contract by EnviroPak also 
constituted a breach of contract by Surgical. 
9. There does not exist sufficient evidence for a claim of 
tortious interference of economic benefits against Surgical. 
10. Mr. Diston is entitled to damages for breach of 
contract in the amount of $54,834.60, representing the difference 
that Plaintiff earned from October 31, 1991, through December 31, 
1992, and the amounts that he would have been entitled to earn 
under the contract with EnviroPak, together with interest at the 
pre-judgment rate for each deficient amount of compensation 
payment from that date the payment was due. 
11. Plaintiff is not entitled to any payments since 
December 31, 1992, because EnviroPak's business was terminated 
12. Because of insufficient evidence, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to any judgment arising from stock options, incentive 
bonuses or car allowance. J^^ 9 
DATED this <J> day of^S^fember, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 2$ day of September, 1993, 
I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by causing the 
same to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8^cPl 
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FILED DISTRICT G0URT 
Third Judicial District 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DISTON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
formerly PINNACLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July 
20, 1993, before the Honorable David Roth, Judge presiding, and 
the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendants, 
jointly and severally, for: 
1. The sum of $54,834.60; plus 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT 
S>l<S>~?l-f53 
Civil No. 920902269CN 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
2. $7,329.48, representing pre-judgment interest from the 
date each payment was respectively due to September 1, 1993, 
with pre-judgment interest at $15.24 per day until entry of 
the Judgment herein; plus 
3. Interest from and after date of judgment at the legal 
rate until paid. ^^y<^ S 
DATED this day of 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
C^rfSTRICT COUKT JUDGE p 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3% day of "S^^^^y^-^ , 
1993, I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utc 
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LETTER OF INTENT 
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
(this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized and 
existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON 
("Employee"). 
1. INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment 
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991. 
2. Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall 
be for three years. 
3. Compensation. 
(a) For all services rendered by Employee, the Company 
shall pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in 
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments. All salary 
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes. 
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed 
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board 
of directors of the Company. 
(b) As an incentive compensation, Employee shall 
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool. 
(c) The Company shall provide health and medical 
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time 
employees. 
(d) The Company shall provide Employee a monthly 
automobile allowance. 
(e) The Company shall provide Employee with stock 
options as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement 
with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with 
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program. 
These options will be determined by the company at the time of 
employment. 
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable 
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business 
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel 
and similar items. 
-1-
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(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid 
vacation of at least two (2) weeks. 
LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written. 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC, 
Duly/)Autfi6rized Officer 
-2-
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ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT 
THIS ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into this 19th day of 
September, 1991, by and between FREDERICK NINOW, an individual CNinow"), ENVIRO PAK 
MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. ( the "Company") , a Utah co rpora t ion , and P I N N A C L E 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, and sole shareholder of the Company ("Pinnacle") 
on the following: 
Premises 
Ninow has developed a business plan to package, market, and service prepackaged medical 
supplies for various health care procedures and desires to participate in the organization of a business 
enterprise to implement such business plan. The Company has or can obtain financial, managerial, 
and other resources that it can provide to such enterprise. Pinnacle, as the sole shareholders of the 
Company desires to provide certain incentives to Ninow and other persons associated with the 
Company. Therefore, the parties desire to join together in organizing a business and operation to 
implement the business plan developed by Ninow. 
Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon these premises which are incorporated herein by reference, and for 
and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth herein, it is hereby agreed as 
follows: 
1. Organization of Company. Immediately preceding the execution of this Agreement, the 
Company has been organized as a Utah corporation with articles of incorporation in the form attached 
hereto as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. As set forth in such articles of incorporation, 
the sole incorporator and initial director of the Company is Todd B. Crosland. The Company will elect 
the following persons as officers and directors: 
Frederick Ninow Director, Chairman, and President 
Rockwell D. Schutjer Director and Vice-President 
Todd B. Crosland Director and Secretary/Treasurer 
2. Assignment of Business Plan. Ninow hereby assigns, conveys, and sets over unto the 
Company all of Ninow's right, title, and interest in and to a business plan, procedure, method of 
practice, and related know-how, information, business contacts, relationships, and other information 
relating to the initiation and operation of a business enterprise to market to hospitals and other health 
care providers prepackaged supply packets containing materials frequently used in surgical and other 
health care procedures, featuring principal components that are laundered, sterilized, and repackaged 
for repeated use, rather than disposed of, all as more particularly described in the materials attached 
hereto as exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference (the "Business Plan"). 
3. Autonomous Operation. During the term hereof, the Company shall have its own 
management, budget, physical facilities, and accounting books and records so as to retain its separate 
identity from Pinnacle and its other subsidiaries. During such period, Pinnacle shall cause the board 
of directors of the Company to consist of four persons, one of whom shall be Ninow, one of whom shall 
be a person designated by Ninow, and two of them shall be designees of Pinnacle. 
4. Financial Support. The Company shall utilize its best efforts to obtain such capital, 
credit enhancement, and other financing as it may reasonably require to acquire, open, and place in 
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operation individual repackaging centers serving appropriate market territories to provide the 
services generally described in the Business Plan at the cost for capital expenditures, startup 
expenses, and related expenditures as more particular described therein, subject to the achievement of 
financial performance for centers previously placed in operation generally consist with the results of 
operations forecast in such Business Plan. 
5. Employment Agreement. Contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the 
Company shall enter into an executive employment agreement with Ninow. 
6. Stock Options for Other Key Employees. As the Company assembles its management 
team of key executives during the next year, Pinnacle shall grant and issue to such key executives as 
the Company may determine,when they become associated with the Company, options to purchase an 
aggregate of 100,000 shares of common stock of the Company under and subject to the terms and 
conditions of Pinnacle's 1989 Stock Option and Stock Award Plan. 
7. Incentive Compensation. The Company shall create a cash incentive compensation pool 
based on the Company's pre-tax profits as a percentage of revenues, to be divided among the various 
members of the executive management group of the Company, in such manner as the board of 
directors of the Company may determine. The amount to be allocated to such incentive compensation 
pool and to be allocated among and paid to such executives shall be determined as follows: 
Percent of Pre-Tax 
Pre-Tax Profits as a 
Percentage of Gross Revenues 
15%, but less than 20% 
20%, but less than 25% 
25%, but less than 30% 
30%, but less than 35% 
35% or more 
Profits Allocated 
to Compensation Pool 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of 
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits 
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income 
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within 
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year 
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount 
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of 
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and 
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given 
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000, 
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be 
allocated to such incentive compensation pool. 
8. Standard Textiles Products. The parties shall cooperate and utilize their best efforts to 
obtain from Standard Textiles such reasonable assurances as Pinnacle and the Company may deem 
adequate respecting the recognition of the conveyance by Ninow to the Company of the Business Plan 
described herein, the initiation of such business by the Company, and the grant to the Company of an 
exclusive marketing territory for selected markets for certain products. 
9. Indemnification 
(a) Pinnacle hereby agrees to indemnify the Company, its executive officers and 
directors, against any and all Pinnacle liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses 
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or damages that the Company or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result 
of any action or failure to act by Pinnacle. 
(b) The Company hereby agrees to indemnify Pinnacle, its executive officers and 
directors, against any and all Company liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses 
or damages that Pinnacle or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result of 
any action or failure to act by the Company. 
10. Term. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect through September 30, 1996. 
11. Notice of Default. No party shall exercise any right or remedy on the alleged default of 
the other party unless such party shall have failed to remedy such alleged default within 30 days after 
notice thereof from the nondefaulting party. 
12. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the state of Utah. 
13. Notices. All notices, demands, requests, or other communications required or authorized 
hereunder shall be deemed given sufficiently if in writing and if personally delivered; if sent by 
facsimile transmission, confirmed with a written copy thereof sent by overnight express delivery; if 
sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid; or if sent by 
overnight express delivery: 
If to the Company, to: EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. 
Attn: Todd B. Crosland 
774 South 500 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Facsimile No.: (801) 359-7755 
If to Ninow, to: Mr. Frederick Ninow 
7490 South Bekkemellom Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
or such other addresses and facsimile numbers as shall be furnished in writing by any party in the 
manner for giving notices hereunder, and any such notice, demand, request, or other communication 
shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so delivered or sent by facsimile transmission, three 
days after the date so mailed, or one day after the date so sent by overnight delivery. 
14. Attorneys1 Fees. In the event that any party institutes any action or suit to enforce this 
Agreement or to secure relief from any default hereunder or breach hereof, the breaching party or 
parties shall reimburse the nonbreaching party or parties for all costs, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, incurred in connection therewith and in enforcing or collecting any judgment rendered therein. 
15. Specific Performance. The parties acknowledge that the rights in this Agreement are 
extraordinary and unique, ^nd that remedies at law may be inadequate to compensate the parties for 
the breach or threatened breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The parties consent to 
the granting of equitable relief, including specific performance or injunction, whether temporary, 
preliminary, or final, in favor of the other party without proof of actual damages. 
16. Survival; Termination. The representations, warranties, and covenants of the respective 
parties shall survive the closing date and the consummation of the transactions herein contemplated. 
17. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which 
shall be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall be but a single instrument. 
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18. No Assignment This Agreement cannot be assigned in whole or in part by one of the 
parties without the prior written consent of all other parties. 
DATE D as of the year and date first above written. 
Frederick Ninow 
ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
d B. Crosland, President 
PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. 
RexCrdsland, President 
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EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into 
effective October 1, 1991, by and between ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah (the "Company"), and FREDERICK 
NINOW ("Executive"). 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants contained herein and of the mutual 
benefits to the parties to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Employment. The Company hereby employs Executive to perform those duties generally 
described in this Agreement, and Executive hereby accepts and agrees to such employment on the 
terms and conditions set forth. 
2. Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall be for a period of five years commencing 
on the date of this Agreement, unless earlier terminated in the manner provided herein. If not 
terminated in writing by the Company or Executive, this Agreement shall continue in effect on a 
month-to-month basis subsequent to expiration of the initial term. Executive understands and 
acknowledges that this Agreement may be terminated by the Company during the initial term in 
accordance with the express provisions of this Agreement and may be terminated at any time 
subsequent to the initial term, by either the Company or the Executive on 15 days' written notice to 
the other. 
3. Duties. During the term of this Agreement, Executive shall be employed by the 
Company, subject to change by the board of directors, as the chief operating executive of the Company 
and shall have all of the rights, powers, and obligations normally associated with such position. 
Executive agrees to serve, at the pleasure of the board of directors of the Company or any parent of the 
Company, as president, director, and chairman of the board of directors of the Company and in such 
additional and/or other offices or positions with the Company or any parent or subsidiary of the 
Company as shall, from time to time, be determined by such board of directors, without compensation 
other than as set forth herein. Executive shall devote his full working time, attention, and energy to 
the business of the Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and shall not during the term of 
this Agreement be engaged in any other business activities which will significantly interfere or 
conflict with the reasonable performance of his duties hereunder. 
4. Best Efforts. Executive agrees that he will faithfully, industriously, and to the best of his 
ability, experience, and talents, perform his duties under the terms of this Agreement and will seek to 
promote and develop the business of the Company. 
5. Compensation 
(a) For all services rendered by Executive, the Company shall pay to Executive a 
salary of $100,000 per year, payable as earned in 24 equal semi-monthly payments. All salary 
payments shall be subject to withholding and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be 
reviewed annually and shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by 
the board of directors of the Company. 
(b) As incentive compensation, Executive shall participate in the Company's cash 
incentive compensation pool from which the Company allocates and pays to its key executives 
cash incentive compensation based on the Company's pretax profits as a percentage of revenues, 
as follows: 
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Pre-Tax Profits as a 
Percentage of Gross Revenues 
Percent of Pre-Tax 
Profits Allocated 
to Compensation Pool 
15%, but less than 20% 1% 
20%, but less than 25% 2% 
25%, but less than 30% 3% 
30%, but less than 35% 4% 
35% or more 5% 
Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of 
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits 
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income 
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within 
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year 
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount 
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of 
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and 
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given 
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000, 
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be 
allocated to such incentive compensation pool. 
6. Working Facilities. The Company shall provide Executive with such reasonable working 
facilities and services, including an office and secretarial assistance, as are necessary and appropriate 
for the performance of his duties. Such facilities and services shall be provided to Executive at the 
Company's principal place of business or such other place as may be reasonably determined by the 
board of directors of the Company. 
7. Employment Benefits. The Company shall provide health and medical insurance for 
Executive in a form and program to be chosen by the Company for its full-time employees. Executive 
shall be entitled to participate in any retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock option, or other plan as 
now in effect or hereafter adopted by the Company on the same basis as other employees. 
8. Vacations. Executive shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation of at least three 
weeks. Vacation shall be taken by Executive at a time and with starting and ending dates mutually 
convenient to the Company and Executive. Vacation or portions of vacations not used in one 
employment year shall carry over to the next succeeding employment year, but shall thereafter expire 
if not used within such succeeding year. 
9. Expenses. The Company will reimburse Executive for actual and reasonable expenses 
incurred by Executive in connection with the business of the Company, including expenses for 
entertainment, travel, attendance at conventions, employee training, and similar items, on 
Executive^ periodic presentation of an itemized account of such expenses, together with supporting 
documentation. 
10. Ownership of Discoveries. Executive agrees to fully and completely disclose any and all 
present and future inventions, improvements, discoveries, techniques, or products (the "Discoveries") 
related to the business or proposed business of the Company resulting from Executive's activities 
during the term of this Agreement, whether such activities are performed on or off the premises of the 
Company. All such Discoveries shall be the sole and exclusive property of the Company. Executive 
agrees to provide all information and data concerning such Discoveries in his possession or control to 
the Company and to lend reasonable assistance to the Company concerning the use and application of 
such Discoveries and shall execute and deliver all such documents and take all such other actions as 
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are reasonably necessary to vest all right, title, and interest in such Discoveries, including patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks with respect thereto, in the Company. 
11. Covenant Not to Compete During Term of Agreement. During the initial term of this 
Agreement and any extension subsequent to the expiration of the initial term, Executive agrees not to 
engage, directly or indirectly, in any business or activity, whether as an employee, equity proprietor, 
or partner, of any corporation or association that competes in any geographic market with the 
Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall not be a 
breach of the provisions of this paragraph for Executive to purchase equity securities in the ordinary 
course of his investments if Executive's sole affiliation with such business or association is the 
ownership of 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association. 
12. Covenant Not to Compete Subsequent to Term of Agreement. Executive acknowledges 
that he will acquire and develop certain methods, skills, and expertise in the operation and conduct of 
the business of the Company during the course of his employment with the Company. Executive 
agrees that for a period of one year subsequent to the expiration or earlier termination of the initial 
term of this Agreement or any extension of that initial term, he will not, directly or indirectly, provide 
services similar to those services to any business, corporation, or other entity that: 
(a) Provides services or products similar to or competitive with the services or 
products provided by the Company to past, present, or prospective customers of the Company; 
(b) Competes with the services or products provided by the Company in any 
geographic market; or 
(c) Is undertaking entry into a geographic market that is similar to or competitive 
with the markets of the Company. 
The covenants contained in this paragraph shall be construed as a series of separate covenants, one for 
each state in the United States of America and one for each country outside the United States of 
America. Except for geographical coverage, each separate covenant shall be deemed identical in its 
terms. If in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate covenants 
deemed included in this paragraph, the unenforceable covenant shall be deemed eliminated from this 
paragraph for the purpose of that proceeding and to the extent necessary to permit the remaining 
separate covenants (meaning the covenants with respect to the remaining geographical areas) to be 
enforced. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed as restricting Executive's right to own shares 
or other equity interests in any corporation or association provided that Executive does not perform 
services for, or participate in any way in the management of such entity in violation of the provisions 
of this paragraph and that Executive owns 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
13. Nondisclosure'of Information. Executive acknowledges that he will have access to 
confidential data and information which is of a special and unique value to the Company, including, 
without limitation, the books and records of the Company relating to operations, finances, accounting, 
sales, personnel, and management; technical information related to proprietary rights of the 
Company; information with respect to customer names, addresses, and requirements; price lists; costs 
of operations, services, and products of the Company; and methods of doing business. Executive agrees 
to keep himself fully informed of the policies and procedures established by the Company for 
safeguarding its property and will strictly comply with those policies and procedures at all times. 
Executive agrees he will not, during or after the term of this Agreement, divulge or appropriate to his 
own use or the use of others, or maliciously divulge to any other person, any trade secret, proprietary 
item, or any item designated "Confidential" by the Company, its parents, or subsidiaries. For 
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purposes of this Agreement, the term "trade secret" shall mean any information, process, or procedure 
utilized by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries which is not public information and which is 
maintained on a confidential basis by the Company, specifically including its methods of pricing, 
biding processes and procedures, supplier lists, supplier agreements, and training procedures. The 
term "proprietary item" shall mean any item of information or data and any processes or procedures 
owned by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries specifically including its customer lists, methods 
of operation, and special procedures utilized in its operations. Executive agrees that he will not, 
except as authorized by the Company, remove any property belonging to the Company from its place of 
business. Executive hereby covenants and agrees to return all documents, information, and data to 
the Company immediately upon termination of this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph 
shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
14. Remedies on Default. If, at any time, Executive breaches, to any material extent, the 
provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 12, or 13 hereof, the Company shall have the right to terminate all of 
its obligations to make further payments under the terms of this Agreement. Executive hereby 
specifically acknowledges that monetary damages to the Company for the breach of certain provisions 
hereunder, specifically including the ownership of Discoveries as set forth in paragraph 10, the 
covenants not to compete set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12, and the nondisclosure of information set 
forth in paragraph 13, may be difficult to determine and/or inadequate to compensate the Company for 
a breach thereof, and hereby agrees that in the event of any breach by Executive of such provisions, 
the Company, in addition to any other remedies it may have under the terms of this Agreement or at 
law, shall have the right to bring an action in equity for an injunction against the breach or threatened 
breach of such obligations or seeking specific performance of the obligations of Executive thereunder. 
If the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
15. Disability. If Executive is unable to perform his services by reason of illness or 
incapacity for a period of more than 12 consecutive weeks, the compensation thereafter payable to him 
by the Company during the continued period of such illness or incapacity shall be reduced by 50%. 
Executive's full compensation shall be reinstated on his return to full employment and discharge of his 
full duties. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Company may terminate this Agreement 
at any time after Executive shall be absent from his employment, for whatever cause, for a continuous 
period of more than six months or for an aggregate of nine months in any 24-month period, and all 
obligations of the Company under the terms of this Agreement shall thereon terminate. 
16. Termination by the Company. In addition to its rights to terminate this Agreement set 
forth elsewhere herein and notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, this Agreement 
and the Executive's employment may be terminated by the Company on the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
(a) Executive's conduct involving the business affairs of the Company constituting 
common law fraud, conviction of a felony, embezzlement from the Company, or other willful or 
malicious unlawful conduct of a similar nature; 
(b) Any material breach by Executive of the provisions of this Agreement; or 
(c) Executive has been grossly negligent in the performance of his duties, has 
substantially failed to meet reasonable standards established by the Company for the 
performance of his duties, or has engaged in any material willful misconduct in the performance 
of his duties hereunder. 
If this Agreement is terminated by the Company in accordance with the provisions of this 
paragraph 16 or as provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the Company shall have no further 
obligation to make further salary payments to Executive under the terms of this Agreement. 
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17. Death During Employment. If Executive dies during the term of this Agreement, the 
Company shall pay to the estate of Executive the compensation that would otherwise be payable to 
Executive up to the end of the month in which his death occurs. 
18. Nontransferability. Neither Executive, his spouse, his designated contingent 
beneficiary, nor their estates shall have any right to anticipate, encumber, or dispose of any payment 
due under this Agreement. Such payments and other rights are expressly declared nonassignable and 
nontransferable except as specifically provided herein. 
19. Indemnification. Except for willful misconduct by Executive, the Company shall 
indemnify Executive and hold him harmless from liability for acts or decisions made by him while 
performing services for the Company if such indemnification is permitted by the Company's certificate 
of incorporation and bylaws, including any future amendments. The Company shall use its best 
efforts to obtain coverage for Executive under any insurance policy now in force or hereinafter 
obtained during the term of this Agreement insuring officers and directors of the Company against 
such liability. 
20. Assignment. This Agreement may not be assigned by either party without the prior 
written consent of the other party. 
21. Stock Options. The Company's parent, Pinnacle Enfironmental, Inc. ("Pinnacle"), shall 
issue to Executive options to purchase common stock under Pinnacle's 1989 Incentive Stock Option 
and Stock Award Plan options to purchase common stock of Pinnacle as follows: 
(a) Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of 
50,000 shares at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at an exercise price of $2.50 per 
share, the approximate fair market price of Pinnacle common stock as quoted on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Automated Quotation system ("NASDAQ") as of the date 
hereof; 
(b) Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of 
50,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at a 
purchase price of $2.50 per share; provided, that options with respect to 25,000 shares shall 
expire on September 30, 1992, if at least one repackaging center is not opened and in operation 
by such date, and further provided, that options for an additional 25,000 shares shall expire on 
September 30, 1993, if Pinnacle has not opened and placed in operation one additional 
repackaging center by such date; and 
(c) An option to purchase 5,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time during a 
five-year period at an exercise price equivalent to the bid price of the Pinnacle common stock in 
the over-the-counter market as of the date of grant, for every repackaging center opened prior 
to September 30, 1996, issuable on the date of such opening. 
All options shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the incentive stock option plan and the 
related form of option that is attached to such plan. 
22. Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties 
with respect to any written or oral negotiations, commitments, and understandings. No letter, 
telegram, or other communication passing between the parties hereto shall be deemed a part of this 
Agreement; nor shall a subsequent communication have the effect of modifying or adding to this 
Agreement unless it is distinctly stated in such letter, telegram, or other communication that it is to 
constitute a part of this Agreement and is signed by the parties to this Agreement. 
-5- 00256 
23. Counterparts and Headings. This Agreement may be executed in two or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one 
and the same instrument. All headings in this Agreement are inserted for convenience or reference 
and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
24. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance 
with the laws of the state of Utah. 
25. Arbitration. In the event of a dispute or controversy between the parties as to the 
provisions or performance of this Agreement, such dispute or controversy shall be submitted to 
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The 
Company and Executive shall each bear 50% of the third party costs of such arbitration. 
26. Severability. If and to the extent that any court of competent jurisdiction holds any 
provision, or any part thereof, of this Agreement to be invalid or unenforceable, such holding shall in 
no way affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement. 
27. Waiver. No failure by any party to insist upon the strict performance of any covenant, 
duty, agreement, or condition of this Agreement or to exercise any right or remedy consequent upon a 
breach hereof shall constitute a waiver of any such breach, any subsequent breach of the same 
obligation, or of any other covenant, agreement, term, or condition. 
28. Litigation Expenses. If any action, suit, or proceeding is brought by a party with respect 
to a matter or matters governed by this Agreement, all costs and expenses of the prevailing party 
incurred in connection with such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid by the 
nonprevailing party. 
AGREED AND ENTERED INTO as of the date first above written. 
THE COMPANY: ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
)uly Authorized Officer 
EXECUTIVE: 
C 0 Z 5 7 
-6-
